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‘Isandula’ 
 
Tho’ Isandula’s fight was lost 
Against sheer numbers as we see, 
Twill rank as Britain’s annals first 
South Africa’s Thermopylae  
       
Irish Times, 17 May, 1879 by E.D
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Chapter One: Introduction 
‘That the Zulu War will be a brief one it would be hazardous to predict’ 
Illustrated London News: 1 March, 1879 
 
On the eleventh of January, 1879, British forces under the command of Lord 
Chelmsford, invaded Zululand one of the last independent nations in Africa. The Zulu people 
united together under the power of Shaka since the 1820’s had increased in strength, 
fighting for their place within their country against natives and white settlers. Over sixty 
years of autonomy was going to be severely threatened by the invasion of the greatest 
power in the nineteenth century. The Zulu King Cetshwayo called up all able-bodied men to 
defend their way of life and ‘wash their spears’. 
 The British colonial policy in South Africa was under the guidance of Sir Bartle Frere, 
the British High Commissioner for South Africa, who conveyed to the British government 
and the people that war, was inevitable between the Zulu, for the protection of the white 
settlers in Natal and surrounding areas. However, the true reason was to extend British 
power across the east coast of South Africa, and to obtain manual labour from the Zulu, a 
highly valuable human resource in their expansionist policy. The Zulu military system was 
feared by all the colonists in the regions surrounding Zululand, with numbers comprising of 
thirty thousand strong warriors. Frere issued an ultimatum to Cetshwayo to demobilise his 
army and desist in his barbaric oppression of his people. Cetshwayo attempted to negotiate 
with the British, but Frere was set on war and military preparations began. On the eleventh 
of December, 1878, Zulu representatives assembled to hear that if they did not comply 
within thirty days to the British demands a state of war would exist between them1. Of 
course these demands totally disregarded Zulu culture leading inevitably to war. Without 
sanction from parliament, the British invasion began with eight months of intense, hard 
                                                          
1
 There were nine demands made to the Zulu King. The main components were contradictory to Zulu custom 
and would never have been agreed upon. Like point four which demanded that the Zulu army should be 
disbanded and only brought together with the consent of the British. Point 5 would give the right to marry 
without the king’s permission. Point Six wanted an administration reform followed by point seven that insisted 
on a British Resident at the Zulu capital. Taken from Narrative of the field operations connected with the Zulu 
War of 1879 (London, 1880) p 16. 
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fighting to break the ‘Old Zulu Order’. Both sides incurred heavy losses in men and material, 
causing universal embarrassment for the British, and the collapse of the young Zulu nation 
before the might of Empire.  
The main focus of this thesis is to research what the Irish and British public knew and 
understood about the Anglo-Zulu War through three famous and popular newspapers- The 
London Times, the Irish Times and the Illustrated London News. This is a topic that needs 
research, and the purpose of the thesis is to help add to the abundant literature covering 
other features of the war. To study the whole war in this thesis would be impossible, so 
three incidents will be researched- the battles of Isandlwana and Ntombe River and the 
death of Louis Bonaparte, the Prince Imperial. The reasons for this selection are arguably 
the most controversial of the war and it will be of great importance to see how these 
incidents were handled in contemporary newspapers. The main question that will arise is 
how these events were reported and how they were perceived by the public? The method 
of attempting this is to give short summaries of the incidents along with contemporary and 
modern critique, and see how they related to the themes and questions raised in the 
newspapers. To understand what was being written on the Zulu War in the papers may 
illustrate an important aspect of British and Irish society and their perceptions of war during 
the age of Imperialism. It will be great importance to note contrasts that emerge from the 
British and Irish papers, to really give a sense of how some social classes in Ireland viewed 
themselves within the empire and did the early British defeats reignite passion for their 
parent nation? All of these points are of importance to the success of the thesis to coincide 
with the public perceptions that were created by newspapers that may have been also been 
altered for the benefit of political, cultural and social idealism within the British Empire? 
 This thesis will break down into five chapters, which include the introduction, the 
conclusion and chapters on the three incidents mentioned above. The research will follow in 
chronological order to illustrate the growth in public interest over the months. It is 
important to detail what information the papers were receiving, either from war 
correspondents, letters from soldiers, battle accounts from officers, and eye-witness 
accounts. 
 The second chapter will cover the battle of Isandlwana, with the main focus on who 
was to blame for the worse British defeat by indigenous warriors in their history? The 
chapter will discuss some of the major issues expressed by modern historians using several  
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primary accounts of the battle to give an idea of how the battle was viewed and understood 
and to act as a background to the main elements expressed in the newspapers. From the 
information provided by the newspapers several issues will need to be examined to 
determine if the reader had a proper and accurate understanding of the battle. Several 
questions needed to be answered. Who was to blame for the defeat? Was the saving of the 
Colours viewed as an act of heroism or cowardice? Did the public immediately demand 
revenge for the defeat or did they decide that the British invasion was wrong? And finally 
did the government attempt to shift the blame to the field commanders in South Africa by 
exclaiming that the war was not sanctioned by them? It is important to state here, that due 
to lack of space within the thesis, the actions of Chelmsford who was absent from the 
battlefields are omitted. 
The third chapter will focus on the battle of Ntombe River which though was a much 
smaller conflict in comparisons to the defeat at Isandlwana, portrayed many of the same 
issues already noted. Did the public blame the commander for the destruction of the small 
convoy? Did the apparent cowardice of an officer fleeing the field, affect the opinions of the 
public, when contrasting the two officers that tried to save the Queens Colours at 
Isandlwana? Did the British public question the effectiveness of the British forces, and their 
commanders following this defeat? Were the Zulu now beginning to be respected for their 
methods and bravery during the fighting? 
The fourth chapter will be based on the death of Prince Louis Bonaparte the heir to 
the Imperial throne of France. Like the previous two chapters, this chapter will look at the 
background to the death of the Prince and discover how the heir of Napoleon Bonaparte 
was fighting for the British in a private war. This chapter will differ somewhat as it is based 
on the death of one man so focus will entirely be placed on who was to blame for the death 
of the Prince? Newspaper coverage reporting on the death of Louis was immense so within 
the confines of the thesis, the research will be based around the incident and not the 
funeral and political aftermath. The newspapers will be researched to find how they 
perceived the death and who did they consider was to blame- the Prince himself, Lieutenant 
Carey, Captain Harrison, Chelmsford, or the government? 
 The fifth and final chapter will attempt to connect all the incidents together to 
determine how much the public knew and understood about the war? It will be useful to 
illustrate any differences in the reporting between the three newspapers and to discover 
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which reader was better informed. To contrast between the Irish and British papers will also 
be of importance. Was the Irish paper more outspoken then their English counterparts?  
 
Literature Review-Primary Sources 
The main focus of the thesis will be based on several newspapers that were in 
circulation at the time of the war. The major papers that will be studied are The London 
Times, the Illustrated London News in Britain, and The Times in Ireland for the Irish 
perspective. Both The London Times in Britain and Ireland are provided by the National 
University of Maynooth. In regards to the Illustrated London News, Trinity College Dublin 
Library was able to provide the primary material needed. In order to enhance the 
perspective of the thesis, firsthand accounts on battles and incidents will be looked at. The 
following selected primary sources are from the Isandlwana court of inquiry from 
participants of the battle by Lieutenant W.F.B Cochrane of the 32nd Regiment, Captain Essex 
of the 75th Regiment, Captain Gardner of the 14th Hussars, Lieutenant Curling of the Royal 
Artillery, Captain Nourse of the Natal Native Contingent which are all available in the 
National Army Museum in London. Also available from the same source is an account by 
Lieutenant Raw of the Mounted Native Contingent. For the battle of Ntombe, primary 
accounts will also come from the same museum, from Sergeant Booth, 80th Regiment, 
Major Charles Tucker, Private Deacon, 80th Regiment and Lieutenant Harward, 80th 
Regiment. For the death of the Prince Imperial, reports from Carey which are contained in 
the War Office Archives will be studied, with also accounts from Surgeon-Major Scott who 
examined the body of the Prince which is contained in the National Army Museum. 
A contemporary book written by C.L Norris-Newman, In Zululand with the British 
throughout the war of 1879, gives an insight to the only journalist that was attached to the 
central column during the Isandlwana defeat. It gives first-hand accounts on many of the 
issues of the war, and in regards to the death of the Prince Imperial, the book includes some 
of the investigations into his death, which will prove invaluable to the thesis. Another book 
by F.E. Colenso and E. Durnford named The history of the Zulu War and its origin, with its 
main focus on blaming the defeat of Isandlwana on Commander-in-Chief Lord Chelmsford. 
To understand the opinion of the Home Government requires the published account by the 
War Office the, Narrative of the field operations connected with the Zulu War of 1879, 
providing many facts, opinions and figures on the war. The published memoirs of Evelyn 
6 
 
Wood From Midshipman to Field Marshall, focuses on his personal experience on key 
aspects of the war, mentioning other events such as the death of the Prince Imperial and 
the battles he was involved with in great detail. 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
The main text in regards the Anglo-Zulu War is the Washing of the Spears by Donald 
R. Morris which was first published in 1966. The book accounts for the rise of the Zulu 
nation, giving an extensive history of the tribes’ early beginnings, the great military and 
economic growth under King Shaka who revolutionised the Zulu system, to the king who 
had to witness his kingdom fall under British aggression. The book covers most aspects of 
the war, but due to the age of the work some doubts emerged after archaeological digs 
during the 1990’s on the Isandlwana battlefield that cast misgivings over his earlier 
assumptions. There is little emphasis in the book on the deployment of troops as a cause of 
the defeat and jamming of rifles. The author based the defeat on the lack of ammunition to 
the front line troops, but only holds true to Durnford troops when holding back the left horn 
of the Zulu attack. Saul David’s Zulu, follows the same line as Morris, with a history of the 
war. However the great asset of the work is the portrayal of the aftermath of Isandlwana 
and Rorkes Drift, with the apparent ‘cover up’ that was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief 
Lord Chelmsford and his staff which is somewhat lacking in Morris’s account. The book is 
very useful for further reading and research, with the inclusion of a very extensive 
bibliography, having primary sources covering a wide spectrum of the war and a wide range 
of secondary reading.  
Ian Knight’s Brave men’s blood is a general work on the war with many illustrations 
and photographs, which help to convey a contemporary view of what the public may have 
been reading in the newspapers during and after the war. The text is not as comprehensive 
as other works but the main issues are covered in the war which establishes itself as a useful 
secondary source. The author offers a critique on some of the main works that have been 
published since the war and also on the important primary/contemporary sources which is 
of great benefit to the reader. Also from the same author is the National Army Museum 
book of the Zulu War, with the main focus on the use of primary sources that are available  
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from the museum. The text is heavily filled with primary sources throughout, which gives an 
excellent view point from the regular British soldier to the officers and commanders on the 
field. The sources that have been used are offered with the direct reference number to the 
archives within the museum, which is extremely helpful to anyone carrying out studies on 
the subject.  
Another useful work is The Illustrated Guide to the Anglo-Zulu War by John Laband 
and Paul Thompson which not only provides a narrative on events, but gives an excellent list 
on the battle combatants and list of causalities and deaths on both sides. The maps included 
in the text are very useful to the reader as it provides detailed disposition on the main 
aspects of the battles. The book also focuses on sometimes neglected aspects of the war, 
such as colonial defences of the areas surrounding Zululand, detailed diagrams of all the 
fortifications built in and around the Zulu countryside and a short chapter on war 
correspondents. The thesis will benefit from this work as it provides a very modern critique 
on the war and tries to cover most aspects of the war, if not in great detail. Great Zulu 
Battles, 1836-1906, by Ian Knight that has a useful exploration of the battle of Isandlwana 
and gives insight into the British and Zulu mindset throughout that fateful day.  
Ian Knights With is Face to the Foe recollects the life and death of the Louis 
Napoleon, the Prince Imperial of France. Aspects of the work that are most useful for the 
study, is the circumstances that led the Prince to be in Zululand and the controversies over 
his death. The book uses a wide range of primary sources, from letters, memoirs to 
newspaper articles. The information and reaction described by the author at the time of the 
Prince’s death, gives an excellent overview of many of the army’s opinion and the public in 
regards to the court-martial of Lieutenant Carey who misbehaved in face of the enemy. A 
book of great resource for the study is The Colonial Wars Source Book, by Philip J. 
Haythornthwaite. The work gives an overview of British imperial politics and policies, 
warfare rhetoric, tactics, weaponry, and the make-up of the British army of regiments, 
cavalry, artillery and commanders. This is essential in understanding the war of 1879, from 
the battles to the overall political structure behind the scenes. Over the course of 
researching for the thesis, one work by Rupert Furneaux The Zulu War-Isandlwana and 
Rorkes Drift, was avoided as the work is outdated with too many inaccuracies appearing 
throughout.  
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Journal Articles 
The following articles can be seen as essential to the thesis; firstly due to the fact 
that they are all modern work dated in this century, and secondly they each take aspects 
that are not wholly covered in other secondary readings. The key article is the 
Reconstructing the past using the British Parliamentary Papers, which helped give the idea 
for the thesis now been undertaken. The prominence of the work is based on the Irish 
University Press of the British Parliament papers, and how certain aspects of the war were 
seen through the eyes of the parliament. The author gives information on the parliamentary 
papers and gives the references to each source that was used within the archives; making 
further study more accessible. While that information is invaluable, the work also gives a 
short critique on some of the main secondary sources that include some mention to the 
parliamentary papers. It also gives insight and advice on how one should carry out work on 
the parliamentary papers, and how they can be used for full efficiency to benefit their work. 
Another article that is essential to the thesis is Heroism, Heroics and the making of Heroes: 
The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. This theme of the work is the idea of the ‘hero’, which was 
instilled into the mindset of the public and army during the nineteenth century. The aspects 
that directly influence the thesis are the propaganda and censorship that was used to cover 
up the disaster of Isandlwana with the author illustrating some issues throughout the work 
on how some aspects of the battles were changed for the benefit of the public, so as not to 
lose faith in the ability of the British soldier. The article will be used to run in conjunction 
with the thesis work, as it follows the same line of what reality of the war was changed to 
suit the government, army and the public.  
The last two articles are of less significance to the thesis, but are still useful in 
providing a different outlook. The first is The subjugation of the Zulus and Sioux: a 
comparative study, which offers an interesting look of the Zulu Empire and the war itself in a 
broader context and contrasted to another native power. The text looks at many aspects of 
the white encroachment on both the Sioux and the Zulu, and how it led to their demise. The 
article is useful in the sense that it further enhances the idea of imperialism by the west and 
provides a useful background to the rhetoric and means by which the white population 
would use to conquer new indigenous lands. The remaining article The reign of King 
Cetshwayo Ka Mpande 1872-9, with the basis of the text on the ruling of the king on social 
and political matters. However, the text is useful in regards the misconceptions that were 
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created about the Zulu King by the whites and the British, seeing him as savage and 
barbaric, to give more of a reason in which to bring the sovereign under British rule.  
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Chapter Two: Battle of Isandlwana  
  
‘A warning to self-willed Statesmen not to allow themselves to be carried away by ambitious 
 projects which are more distinguished by romance than reason’ 
 Illustrated London News: 8 March, 1879 
On the 20th of January, the Commander-in-Chief of her Majesty’s forces in South 
Africa Lord Chelmsford2 moved up the centre column from Rorkes Drift, some eight miles, to 
the plains shadowed by Isandlwana Hill3. The column would set up camp in front of the hill 
for the next few days until a new site was chosen further along the road towards the Zulu 
capital, Ulundi. The camp was left to its own devices with some reconnaissance patrols 
ordered and some movement of transport coming from Rorkes Drift. During the time of 
their stay in the camp, no order was giving to make any makeshift defences or laagering due 
to Chelmsford’s reasoning that it was only a temporary camp and the land was too poor for 
entrenchment. That decision was in direct violation of army regulations that were in place 
that ordered that laagering should always occur or at least some defensives measures 
capable of deterring an attack. For the time being, Chelmsford was planning their next camp 
some twelve miles away, he sent out parties of men for reconnaissance to see if any of the 
enemy was present. Chelmsford was eager to hear news of Zulus for he wished to give 
battle and defeat them cleanly in a single encounter. The first main sighting of large 
amounts of Zulus came from Major Dartnell while on patrol on the 21st in near darkness. A 
request was received by Chelmsford at around 2 a.m. for reinforcements to support the 
major who believed he had stumbled on the location of the main Zulu Army. It was agreed 
upon to strike half the camp and set out to encounter the Zulu in force and move to the 
next camp. 
 At dawn Chelmsford moved out of the camp, with six companies of the 2/24th, four 
seven-pounder guns, some mounted infantry and Natal Native Pioneers. The camp was left 
                                                          
2
Frederic Augustus Thesiger was born in 1827. He saw action in the Crimea and the Sepoy Rebellion in India 
before commanding British troops during the Cape Frontier War in South Africa, which led to his eventual 
promotion to command the Queen’s army into Zululand. 
3
 Isandlwana was named so by the Zulu meaning ‘something like a small hut’ which it resembled the part of the 
cow’s stomach. For the 24th regiment it reminded them of the sphinx which was the symbol on their regimental 
badge. 
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under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, commander of the 1/24th with orders to 
defend the camp and a further order for Colonel Durnford to move up with his second 
column to reinforce the camp4. Chelmsford left behind a camp of some 67 officers and 
1,707 men consisting of five companies of the 1/24th, one company of the 2/24th, four 
companies of the 3rd NNC, over a hundred mounted men made up from detachments and 
two seven-pounders. Under Durnford’s column there was the Natal Native Horse along with 
three 9-nine pounder rockets with 250 men. The Commander-in-Chief had the confidence 
that the men he left behind would be able to deter a Zulu attack with the ‘...materials for a 
hasty entrenchment...’ at hand to complete ‘...a successful resistance’5. As Ian Knight points 
out, Chelmsford confidence in his men that he left behind, coincided with the decision to 
appoint Pulleine as camp commander. Pulleine had some experience in the Cape Frontier 
campaign but he was a man ‘whose expertise lay as an effective administrator rather than a 
front-line commander’6. Chelmsford would have his mind on other issues so he wanted to 
leave the camp in capable hands keeping the camp well provisioned with constant supply of 
transport wagons. Chelmsford main message to Pulleine was to insure the safety of the 
camp by remaining in a defensive posture. As Chelmsford marched off in the direction of 
Dartnell, the men that were left behind in the camp were left highly disappointed in the 
belief that they were missing out in the first encounter with the Zulu. Between reveille and 
the arrival of Durnford’s column at 10.30 a.m. some sightings of Zulus were reported 
throughout the morning, in different directions some miles from the camp but no 
precautions were taking other than to draw back in the troops to the camp7.  
By orders from Chelmsford, Durnford and his men moved up to the camp from 
Rorkes Drift with perhaps the expectation of fresh orders to be given upon his arrival. 
Further orders were never issued to Durnford, thus beginning the series of events that 
would lead to the most controversial part of the battle. With his arrival in the camp who was 
in charge, Durnford or Pulleine? The question of command is a complicated issue. When 
Durnford rode into the camp he was under the order to simply reinforce the camp with no 
further mention of any other necessities. With no more conclusive orders by Chelmsford,  
                                                          
4
The 24
th
 Regiment also had served under Lord Chelmsford during the Cape Frontier War of 1878. The 
regiment acquitted themselves well and became a hardened fighting unit in harsh African conditions. 
5
Irish Times, 3 March, 1879. 
6
 Ian Knight, The National Army Museum book of the Zulu War (London, 2004) p, 89. 
7
 Pulleine sent a message to Chelmsford of these movements stating ‘that the Zulus are advancing in force from 
left front of the camp’. Due to lack of details and urgency the warning would go unheeded until it was too late.   
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who may have believed that due to the fact that Durnford was senior to Pulleine that he 
should take upon Pulleines original order to defend the camp. However Durnford did not 
feel bound to the orders given to Pulleine as it was not addressed to him personally, but he 
was senior to in the camp and still regarded all the troops under his disposal. On hearing 
reports from sentries of the Zulu movements, and of one report of the Zulus marching in the 
direction of Chelmsford, he took initiative of taking his men out of the camp to intercept the 
Zulus for perhaps the reason of showing how useful he was to Chelmsford and for personal 
reasons8.  
 Before Durnford set off, Lieutenant William Cochrane of the 32nd Regiment was close 
at hand to hear the conversation that was between Pulleine and Durnford: 
...Colonel Pulleine gave over to Colonel Durnford a verbal state of troops in camp at 
the time, and stated the orders had received...to defend the camp; these words 
were repeated two or three times during the conversation...Before leaving, he asked 
Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of the 24th Regiment. Colonel Pulleine 
said that his orders he had received he could not do it, but agreed with Colonel 
Durnford to send him help if he got into difficulties.9 
Durnford’s actions and his apparent disobeying of orders was the scapegoat that would be 
needed after the battle of Isandlwana for Chelmsford, to shoulder the blame on the senior 
officer for not remaining in the camp. This line of argument is taking up by the author Saul 
David, who mentions that Colonel Crealock, Chelmsford’s Secretary, insisted that he had 
ordered Durnford to take command of the camp, and in essence disobeying the order to 
remain defensive. Despite the fact that he was lying about this to cover the reputation of 
himself and his commander. It was the answer that Chelmsford had looked for to wash his 
hands clean of responsibility of the disaster and blame the man who could no longer answer 
for himself. While Crealock himself grasped the opportunity with both hands to rid the 
plague of responsibility on the command there is little evidence that Chelmsford was a part 
of the conspiracy other than ‘simply grasped the proffered lifeline’10.  
Durnford’s main plan was to prevent Chelmsford column being attacked in the rear, 
by cutting of the Zulu attack by encircling them in conjunction with Stepstone’s men. As 
                                                          
8
There was a belief that Durnford wanted to wash away the stain that was already on his career, after the debacle 
of Bushman’s Pass, where he himself got badly injured and several colonists killed for a mission against a tribe 
in 1873. If he could succeed in having a successful campaign, the colonists and the Natal Press may have 
forgiving his previous actions. 
9
The National Army Museum, Lieutenant William Cochrane, 32
nd
 Regiment (Isandlwana court of inquiry, BBP 
C 2260)  
10
 Saul David, Zulu: the heroism and tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879 (London, 2004) p 208. 
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Stepstone’s mounted men, patrolled the ridges, they came across a group of Zulus herding 
cattle and galloped after them in a north-east direction towards Ngwebeni. Just as the 
soldiers appeared over the ridge they looked down into the valley, and as Lieutenant Raw 
recalls ‘the whole army shewing[sic] itself from behind the hill in front where they had 
evidently been waiting’11. Raw had stumbled across the main Zulu army numbering some 
25,000 that had eluded Chelmsford for two days12.  The moment the Zulus saw the mounted 
men, they rose up and gave chase, thus beginning the fateful battle of Isandlwana.   
Pulleine received the message of the Zulu advance at about 12.15 hrs, and ordered 
the camp to form up and began to deploy them across the sphere of the camp, with the 
artillery pushed forward under Major Smith to a rocky outlet giving a good advantage of 
view. Before Durnford had left, Pulleine had promised him to send aid if he got into trouble, 
and with this in mind while Durnford was holding back the left horn, it left Pulleine with less 
mind to concentrate on the camp and more on supporting his senior commander. It resulted 
in him pushing his men out a few hundred yards from the camp, in long open skirmish 
order, thus throwing away the advantage of concentrated fire-power delivered from a tight-
all round formation13. Coinciding with the men pushed so far out; there is a strong belief 
that the reason for defeat was the difficulty to resupply ammunition to the front-line troops, 
with gaps appearing in the line of fire as their bullets began to run out. As Ian Knight points 
out that this may hold truth in Durnford’s men far from the camp but not for the infantry 
line. He goes on to say that due to recent archaeological work, and testament from 
survivors, that they were indeed supported well by incoming ammunition, and the lack of it 
was not an issue14.  
Despite the men of the 24th Regiment being ‘old and steady shots’, and were secure 
for the time being, the climax of the battle had been reached on the right side of the camp 
with Durnford. Durnford were holding back the Zulu left horn, and while beating them back 
with some heavy losses to the Zulu, lack of ammunition and a danger of being outflanked 
and cut off from the camp, the order was giving to abandon their defensive position in the  
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donga and ride back to the camp. Just at that moment the Natal Native Contingent broke 
and fled from their position exposing the flanks of Lieutenant Pope of G Company who was 
sent out to cover Durnford, leaving him no chance to turn back towards the hill15. At this 
time Pulleine realising the danger the camp was in, he ordered the bugle to sound ‘retire’ so 
he could form up a concentrated formation. But as the men retreated back steadily, with 
some more than others, wide gaps began to emerge in the line and the Zulu pressed 
forward this advantage. The British position and the chance of an organised defence 
collapsed with the pace of the Zulu rush. As Captain Essex recalls  
...Few of the men...had time to fix bayonets before the enemy was among them 
using their assegais with fearful effect. I heard officers calling their men to be steady; 
but the retreat became in a few seconds general...towards the direction of Rorkes 
Drift. However...the enemy arrived and the large circle had closed in on us16. 
Escape for the majority of the men was ended as the horns of the buffalo closed in on the 
camp. The companies of the 24th that remained with their officers in the last desperate act 
of survival, while Durnford and some of his men tried to keep some escape route open by 
holding back the left horn. Durnford fell while doing his duty, while Pulleine who was 
probably among the men at the wagon park died making a last stand. While company after 
company fell to the Zulu hordes, one group of the 24th managed to survive the longest by 
deploying a firing retreat back to perhaps Rorkes Drift. However along the way more and 
more men dropped to the Zulu throughout the broken ground, thus leaving a handful on the 
banks looking down the Manzimnyama Valley, where progress ceased. The party were 
overrun and the last organised defence collapsed. 
While the battle was over within the camp, the men who managed to escape the 
carnage were fleeing back towards Rorkes Drift. Many were cut down by the closing horns 
and escape was almost impossible without the aid of a horse. Perhaps the most iconic 
imagery of the battle and the war is the famous attempt to save the Queens Colours by 
Lieutenant Melville and aided by Lieutenant Coghill. The colours were the pride of any 
regiment and if they had fallen into the enemy’s hands it would be viewed as a disgrace. The 
story goes that as the camp was falling Pulleine gave the colours to Melville in order to save  
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them and sent Coghill to aid him in his mission. Other views were that Melville took the 
colour in order to rally any surviving men to him, but at this stage defence was over and 
then decided to leave the camp. However more cynical views, is that it gave him the excuse 
to leave the camp, with no evidence to suggest he was ordered to take the colour but that 
was not a popular opinion among officers of the 24th Regiment after the battle17. Coghill 
himself did not even leave with Melville with the colour, as he may have left sometime 
before and by chance they met up along the Buffalo River. They plunged their horses into 
the river but only Coghill managed to get out with his horse as the current was too strong 
for Melville to withstand. Despite the fact that Coghill may have fled the camp, he showed 
true courage by going back to aid Melville, even though he had a good chance of escape. He 
managed to help Melville out of the river but the colours were lost in the current and both 
horses were now dead. They climbed up a slope along the bank, and due to sheer 
exhaustion then turned around with a large rock to their backs, and died making their last 
stand.  
The story of the two officers attempting to save the Queens Colours reached heroic 
levels which gave the public some comfort in realising that despite defeat, the regiment and 
the empire never lost its honour and prestige due to the Lieutenants18. Michael Lieven notes 
the public needed these heroes for reassuring the greatness of the British army, ‘in their 
attempt to save the colour, the mystical soul of the battalion that bore the legend of it 
history, and their ‘ride to glory’ became a powerful symbol of self-sacrifice’19. While the 
media, the public and the officers of the regiment took solace in the sacrifice of Melville and 
Coghill not all were as happy in the actions of the two, but such opinions would have never 
been able to surface in the papers. Sir Garnet Wolseley, future Commander-in-Chief of the 
British forces in Zululand, noted in his journal, 
I am very sorry that both these officers were not killed with their men at Isandhlana 
instead of where they were. I don’t like the idea of officers escaping on horseback 
when their men on foot are killed...Heroes have been made of men like Mellville [sic] 
and Coghill who taking advantage of their horses, bolted from the scene of the 
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actions to save their lives...It is monstrous making heroes of those who saved or 
attempted to save their lives by bolting20.  
The battle of Isandlwana had smashed Lord Chelmsford invasion plan, which had only begun 
two weeks earlier. The total dead of the British army was nearly 1800, with fifty-two officers 
dead; 739 white troops; sixty-seven NCO’s of the NNC and 471 black troops, with only fifty-
five Europeans surviving. To show the true magnitude of the effect it would have on the 
army and the public, the following excerpt from Sir M. Hicks-Beach when addressing the 
Parliament illustrates there were less fatalities lack of deaths even in higher profiled battles. 
He says... 
Our encounter with the Zulus are out of all proportion to the British forces engaged 
and to the average casualties in war. Our killed at Isandhlwana eclipsed the best-
remembered figures of the Crimean War- twenty-six British officers and 327 men 
killed at the Alma and 462 English and French, killed at Inkerman. The proportions at 
Balaklava, where 472 fell out of a total of 670 engaged, came nearest to those of the 
early results of this war with the Zulus21. 
The Zulu losses numbered some 2,000 dead, with many seriously wounded, dying later from 
their injuries. The death toll was very high for the civilian army and it had a great morale 
effect on the army, as it would take months to fully mobilise again. When King Cetshwayo 
heard of the losses of so many of his men, he exclaimed ‘a spear has been trust into the 
belly of the nation...there are not enough tears to mourn for the dead’. Despite the fact the 
British Government did not want a war with the Zulu King; revenge was on the agenda, with 
reinforcements sent to Chelmsford to pursue this goal. As the author Ian Knight plainly puts 
it ‘Isandlwana would prove to be both the Zulu Kingdom’s greatest victory, and the moment 
at which its destruction became assured’22.  
So from reading the newspapers the Irish Times, London Times and the Illustrated 
London News, what did the public actually understand and know about the battle of 
Isandlwana, and did any of the opinions displayed in the papers conflict reality? With 
regards the secondary reading, there are many different hypothesis on why the British were 
defeated. From the examples given above, we see many of the reasons that would coincide 
with the defeat such as the shortage of ammunition; the question of command between  
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Pulleine and Durnford; Lord Chelmsford for not giving clear orders to Durnford and splitting 
his men up in enemy country; Durnford’s actions during the battle; Pulleines deployment of 
the troops? But from the information giving to the readers of the papers about to analysed, 
did they have these assumptions, and more importantly who did they seem to hold the 
defeat accountable?  
The disaster that befell the Lord Chelmsford’s central column was a huge talking 
point for the newspapers across the British Isles, Europe and the world, and the Irish Times 
was no exception. The paper provided a vast amount of detail to the public such as the 
order of battle from participants’ narratives, parliament debates, messages from the Queen 
to her subjects in Zululand, reasons for the fall of the camp, and the most debated topic of 
all, as who was to blame for the defeat at Isandlwana?  
  The first few reports of the battle took the form of publishing accounts sent from 
South Africa from correspondents like Charles Norris-Newman of the Evening Standard and 
narratives from participants. The reasons for the British defeat when first reported was due 
to many reasons such as no laager, lack of ammunition, a badly chosen area for defence, 
neglect and even due to a sheer blunder. However despite the reasons that the public 
perceived that contributed to the defeat, the paper were also able to give a version that the 
defence was remarkable in a sense of being able to hold back the Zulu charge ‘in the open, 
and with no protection or cover to keep off...the large numbers of Kaffirs that must of 
attacked them’23. This is clearly an attempt for solace following a disastrous defeat and 
believing that the British soldier was still able to fight his best and in a way continue the 
myth of the great British ‘last stands’ that are widespread in their annals. The same report 
also tries to diminish the victory of the Zulu and their skill by suggesting that it was sheer 
luck that contributed to their victory. It reads that the ‘impression in Natal is that the 
engagement on the part of the Zulu is not attributable to generalship, but the army of 
invasion was making for Natal and accidently came across the rear guard of Colonel Glyn’s 
column’24. The reader can take two bits of information from this short line that it was a 
sheer bad luck that the British were caught out by the Zulu in their rear, but perhaps more 
importantly the reader can see that it is suggesting that the Zulus were preparing to invade 
Natal, giving further precedent for war. 
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 While the early reports of the battle were giving the narrative of the battle with 
some analysis of what the writers thought what caused the defeat, it was still very broad 
and no blame was on any of the officers. However, on March 1st, the paper ran a piece from 
the war correspondent Charles Norris-Newman, who sent back his report on the action, 
which gives the reader much to think about when considering the reason for defeat and 
who was to blame? He notes that the day he left the camp of Isandlwana, there were no 
precautions made of any sort to deter a Zulu attack. He mentions despite the fact that ‘clear 
and distinct orders given and published in an official book Regulations for the Field Forces in 
South Africa, not a single step was taken in another way to defend our new position...it is to 
this error of judgement that I cannot help attributing that awful results that awaited’25. The 
reader would realise that Chelmsford at this time was still in the camp at this stage and 
should have ordered the wagons to be positioned to form a laager which was standard army 
regulations. This is a direct criticism of the higher command who failed to defend the camp 
showing contempt for the Zulus.  The report that Norris-Newman provides also appears in 
his book on the war in 1880, but he is far more critical in his opinion of the actions of the 
British command. He writes ‘the column itself was hardly strong enough to advance through 
the country, protect its camp, &c, keep open its rear...we were proceeding with too much 
confidence’26. He may not have written this at the time as he may not have conceived such 
opinions until the writing of the book, but it could be more probable that he could not 
include such thoughts into a conservative newspaper like the Irish Times, without causing 
grief and annoyance especially when the court of enquiry with its findings on the battle had 
yet to reach the public sphere. 
 ‘There falls to our lot the most painful and perhaps the most ungrateful duty that 
can fall to the lot of the public journal, the duty of saying in plain and unmistakable language 
that Lord Chelmsford has failed as our commander-in-Chief in South Africa, and that he 
ought to be instantly recalled. It cannot be said that we have judged rashly and 
inconsiderately’27. The papers printed the British government debates on the issues 
surrounding the battle and on Chelmsford, which showed a vigorous back lash against the 
commander and the High Commissioner of South Africa Sir Bartle Frere. The government 
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were also to shoulder much of the blame for the disaster. The information that can be found 
from the newspapers on the Parliamentary debates is too much for a detailed analysis at 
this point, but it is something that will be looked at again in greater detail. However a brief 
summary of them will be of benefit to the thesis. 
 Over the following weeks, the main topics of debate in the House of Lords, the 
House of Commons, in relation to the Zulu War were included in the Irish Times. The 
government would have to react quickly to the growing criticism from the shadow 
government, the press and the public. During this time the government under Sir Benjamin 
Disraeli, had more pressing problems in Afghanistan with major European consequences at 
hand28. But the public demand for retribution after Isandlwana left him no choice but to 
invest more time and money to settle the war. The war was initiated by Frere to persuade 
many to see sense in beginning conflict, but the war was still not sanctioned by the 
government. This was an opportunity for the government to direct criticism on the actions 
of Frere and Chelmsford in causing an unjust war that the government did not sanction. The 
Irish Times would illustrate the amount of blame that was shifted onto the High 
Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief from the government and also raises that 
question for the modern reader; If the government had placed so much blame on 
Chelmsford and Frere, why did the battle lead to the fall of Disraeli from government in 
1880? These are questions which will be hopefully answered some other time in greater 
detail. 
 The Irish Times, as expected had no sharp criticism of the actions of Lieutenants 
Melville and Coghill, but of praise of their gallant deed. As pointed out in the chapter 
General Wolseley was less concerned about the saving of the colours and more of the sight 
of two officers’ abandoning their men. Such thoughts would never appear in the papers, as 
the public needed reassurance from the defeat that the British gentleman died a hero’s 
death for the honour and prestige of the empire. The Queen like the public was so affected 
by the apparent unselfishness of the two officers that she ordered that they would have 
been awarded the Victoria Cross had they survived. After an article given in the paper that 
praised the conduct of the two officers, a letter was received the next day from Irish man J.J 
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Coghill, the father of Lieutenant Coghill. He writes ‘thanking you very gratefully for the 
warm terms of praise you have bestowed upon my son’s conduct at Isandula’29. With 
sentiments appearing in the Irish Times it would be clear that no criticism would ever exist 
in the papers of the day. 
The London Times was able to produce a vast amount of information, debates, 
concerns and intellectual questions for the reasoning of the defeat30. In this case while The 
Irish Times, continued to rewrite much of the same material in many of their articles, The 
London Times was able to grasp more pressing issues of the war and this is reflected by the 
immense interest the public had on the battle with the amount of letters sent to the editors 
of the paper. Besides the question of the battle, The London Times went back in time before 
the outbreak of the hostilities, with a look at the Parliamentary Blue-books, which would 
give a vast amount of information on the war. The inclusion of the information of the Blue-
books may suggest that the readers of the London paper were much more knowledgeable 
on the pressing issues than the readers of the Irish paper, which included little mention of 
the books. The paper included much the same accounts and despatches from the war 
correspondents and Chelmsford, but it had one extra despatch from Chelmsford’s Acting 
Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock. This segment from him is the most direct 
indication of who was to blame in all other despatches and narratives that laced the papers 
from Ireland and London. While the other despatches may have said that Durnford was 
ordered to the camp, and also the camp should have stayed defensive contrary to the 
actions by Durnford, Crealock explains straight away that... 
I sent a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford R.E., commander of No.2 
Column, to the following effect (I copied the it in my note-book, which was 
afterwards lost)-move up to Isandlana Camp...take command of it...Such instructions 
would, I consider...be binding on Colonel Durnford on his assuming command of the 
camp31. 
This despatch can be seen as a hugely important moment for the reader to understand the 
battle, as it clearly suggests that Durnford was the person in charge and did not follow the 
written orders. While it is known today it was an attempt from Crealock to deflect the  
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blame from his commander, the public at the time would have to make up their own mind. 
However before the statement released by Crealock, much of the public did not resent 
Chelmsford or request for his recall as much as the paper wrote or what  parliament was 
saying. Two letters to the editor on the same day provided the strongest defence of 
Chelmsford that is to be seen in any of the papers. The first letter was from Alfred H. 
Thesiger, who was Chelmsford brother yet he warns us that ‘I am not blinded by 
relationship or affection in complaining of the cruel injustice...by attacks of anonymous and 
irresponsible writers’32. He goes on by not defending the actions of his brother on the day of 
the battle, but reasonably suggests for writers to stop encouraging the public against him 
‘before his case has been heard’. While clearly he would have bias towards his brother, it 
was reasonably to suggest stop criticising him until more information was released on the 
disaster to the public.  
However, while one would expect some defence from their family, the next letter 
from a man who served under Chelmsford before sets about eradicating any wrong-doing 
the general may have done in a convincing manner. The writer is correct in saying that the 
camp was merely a halting area for the column, and ‘Lord Chelmsford...was justified in not 
entrenching his camp’ for his reasoning ‘Have we an instance on record of any invading 
army entrenching itself?’ He goes on to say Pulleine and Durnford were giving orders to 
remain on the defensive, yet from the first sighting of the Zulus until the first initial attack 
‘no attempts were made...to strike the tents, to throw up hasty shelter trenches, to laager 
the wagons or even to warn the General of an impending attack...Colonel Durnford and 
Pulleine acted in defiance of the Field Exercises and Evolutions of the Army’33. It is clear from 
the letter that the writer wishes to deflect the responsibility from Chelmsford to Durnford 
and Pulleine, for failing to comply with normal army regulations. The two letters mentioned 
are from people with some personal links to Chelmsford, and it further illustrates that The 
London Times readers had much more information on the key debates34, unlike the Irish 
Times, which had few publications of criticism other than from the British government 
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creating little public opinion. To further augment how the paper was more informative to 
the reader than their Irish counterpart, was the other topics of debates that emerged from 
the battle including the shortcomings of modern weaponry, with some interactive debates 
from the public. 
 In contrast to the Irish Times and The London Times, the Illustrated London News, 
which was a weekly paper; had the benefit of excellent drawings included with the text. 
While the news was not as comprehensive as the other papers, it still managed to make 
within its content interesting observations on the battle of Isandlwana and the war in 
general. The news of the disaster of Isandlwana first came to the reader’s attention in the 
Illustrated London News, on the 15th of February. Previous to that date, there was little 
information on the possibility of war, with the previous week’s attention on the details of 
the ultimatum of war presented to the Zulu King for fear ‘of the larger military force 
maintained by Cetwayo’35. A state of war had existed in early January, but the report was 
only given in mid-February, which may convey the public’s lack of interest to just another 
colonial adventure and perhaps as it was not being sanctioned by the government. Public 
interest would increase dramatically, when news reached England of a ‘British Reserve’. The 
first report of the battle comes from Lord Chelmsford that was sent to the War Office, dated 
the 10th of February. The information is short, and only some reasoning was given for 
defeat, with merits some truth ‘that the troops were enticed away from the camp’36, 
perhaps referring to Durnford.  
As expected, information is scarce during the early reports, but it is worth noting a 
list of the dead was published with Colonel Durnford the first mentioned, suggesting that he 
was in charge of the ill-fated camp with blame resting on him. With the papers issued on the 
first of March, the information carried to the reader was more comprehensive. The key 
wording in this section was ‘Colonel Durnfords Column’ which may coincide with the 
previous week of him ‘detaching a portion of his forces from the sheltered encampment’37 
to face the Zulu army. An intelligent reader may grasp that the immediate information being 
provided suggests that the column was in fact Durnford’s, meaning that blame was resting 
on his shoulders. On the same issue there is a detailed account of the action from a survivor 
                                                          
35
 Illustrated London News, 8 February, 1879. 
36
 Ibid, 15 February, 1879. 
37
 Ibid, 22 February, 1879. 
29 
 
that in essence it provides a good early visual of the battle. It even goes as far as blaming 
the cause of disaster on ‘the disadvantage of the wagons not being packed in laager’38 but 
no question on who should have ordered this.  
On the 8th of March, Lord Chelmsford sent another despatch of the details and his 
views on the battle. There is some suggestion that he was blaming Durnford while he was 
writing the despatch. He mentions that Pulleine received instructions to defend the camp, 
while Durnford was requesting two companies to join his men in searching the plains for 
Zulus. Pulleine refused as it was contrary to orders giving, yet Durnford still proceeded with 
his men. He writes... 
Had the force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp and utilised 
there the materials for a hasty entrenchment...I feel absolutely confident that the 
whole Zulu army would not have been able to dislodge them...however...eagerness 
to close the enemy, allowed themselves to be drawn away from the line of 
defence39. 
The reader can take two points from this reading. First that Durnford should of taking up a 
defensive position, thus was the reason for defeat but also it shows Chelmsford trying to 
wash his hands from responsibility to the disaster, by claiming that the resources for 
defensive measures such as laagering were provided and should have been used40. The 
Illustrated London News, in light of the Isandlwana disaster, gave the case of not laagering 
was a reason for the defeat, and ran a section of their paper to the benefits of this defensive 
structure. They give a detailed description of how the laager would be formed and 
reinforced by troops. They follow on with that the British could not hold against the masses 
of Zulus as it stood so ‘we believe it to be absolutely impossible for the same enemy in equal 
numbers to force a position of such strength’41 if the laager had been in place.   
 While the essence of the chapter is on the battle itself, the Illustrated London News, 
did have one aspect that is important to note as it goes much further than criticising the 
government or commanders but the actual ideas that formed the backbone of the empire, 
which lacked in the other two papers. It begins on the 8th of March the Illustrated London 
News, gave an unrelenting attack on the conduct of Sir Bartle Frere for provoking a war that  
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no reason yet ‘can be held to demonstrate the necessity of immediate invasion’. The writer 
is hugely critical, by suggesting that due to the High Commissioners actions coinciding with 
the defeat at Isandlwana, has left Natal open to invasion from the Zulus and also the knock 
on effect of the Boers of the Transvaal who are intent on ‘reasserting their claims to 
independence’. It then goes onto asking questions that one would hear in the twentieth 
century and present day of the West interference with other cultures of the world. The 
questions asked to the reader are as follows: 
Can we hammer civilisation into savage minds by sheer force? Have we any proof 
that such policy has been largely successful? Will the conquest of Zululand which is 
almost certain to be achieved be followed by results of which modern civilisation can 
boast? Are we to fight our way through Africa or shall we win it?42 
This can be viewed as a direct criticism to jingoism that formed the idealism of the British 
Empire. It seems that the writer sees the conquest on the ‘savage minds’ as outdated and 
modern policy is needed to embrace new people into the sphere of the empire. It has some 
similar traits to General Gordon of Khartoum a few years later, who believed that justice, 
loyalty and the development of the community spirit should be given to the Sudan without 
the oppression of the parent state.  
 However while the writer preaches his views on the war, the paper itself is hardly 
allowing the dust to settle with drawings of the commanders and officers of the British dead 
at Isandlwana on the front cover of the news which would certainly incite the public to 
demand a revengeful conclusion to the war. Drawings made in the paper shows the 
excitement of the reinforcements making their trip to Zululand with sup-captions reading 
‘good bye Bill. I wouldn’t be out of this for fifty pounds’43. The drawings are pure jingoism, 
and it illustrates that the soldiers are going to go out to Africa, with all necessary weapons 
and logistics, with no possibility of negotiations until revenge is complete. Coinciding with 
the pursuit of revenge instilled into the soldiers’ minds, the paper also shows a contrasting 
view to the war, one far from the heroics of the empire.  
In viewing the three papers one can see that the disaster of Isandlwana had a huge 
effect on the public and on the government, where all thoughts of the superiority of the 
white men over the ‘savages’, was questioned after the defeat. The three papers took up 
the issues and debates from the government and the people, but all in their own way. The 
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Irish Times took a rather tame look at the battle with little independent view on the battle, 
other than repeating what was coming in from the despatches and reporting on parliament 
debates. The London Times went one step further by including letters from the public, which 
began a debate on many issues of the battle especially over the question of command. 
However the Illustrated London News, while in some cases the reports were bland and 
differed little from the other papers in what was included, their writers in one case was the 
most modern and forward thinking of them all, by representing an idea that would really 
take hold in the twentieth century, that one cannot force Western ideologies of an empire 
onto people seen as inferior. 
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Chapter Three: Battle of Ntombe River 
‘The severe warning given by the disaster at Isandula does not seem 
 to have sufficiently impressed on our officers’ 
 Irish Times: 12 April, 1879. 
 
Following the huge setback to Lord Chelmsford’s central column after the defeat of 
Isandlwana, the momentum of the war began to reverse in favour for the commander-in-
chief of the British forces. While he set about devising his new tactical invasion of Zululand 
before reinforcements arrived from throughout the Empire, the other columns were fairing 
well, despite isolation. The columns were expecting the whole Zulu army to attack them at 
any time and preparations for defence, scouting and offensive actions continued. The left 
column under the command of Colonel Evelyn Wood was encouraging skirmish attacks 
along the range of the camps frontier, whilst achieving sufficient diplomatic success. He 
accepted the surrender of prominent Zulu leaders and 1,300 followers, including women 
and children. However these incidents were not a common occurrence and fresh attacks by 
the Zulu were deployed across the countryside, with a significant attack at a white farm in 
the Luneburg District44. In a bid to offer protection to the region, Wood ordered five 
companies of the 80th Regiment (Staffordshire Volunteers) under Major Charles Tucker to 
garrison Luneburg on the 15th of February.  
Supplies for the upkeep of the garrison and troops were being received from the 
district of Derby to the north of Luneburg. For these supplies to meet their destination 
safely, a detachment of one-company of the 80th Regiment under the command of Irishman 
Captain David Moriarty was sent out to protect the final arrival through Zulu countryside45. 
On the 9th of March, Moriarty had managed to gather the supply wagons together, 
consisting of 90,000 rounds of ammunition and other goods, and had reached the Ntombe 
River some five miles distance from Luneburg. However, the river was swollen and it was 
only possible for a few wagons to cross. After Lieutenant H.H. Harward and Sergeant Booth 
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had crossed the river with thirty four men, it left the remaining men and wagons with 
Captain Moriarty on the north side who then constructed a ‘V’ shape laager resting on the 
bank. The defences would prove to be extremely inadequate for deterring a Zulu attack and 
would illustrate that lessons were not learnt of the importance of strong defensive 
perimeters as seen at Rorkes Drift. Major Tucker concerned about the convoy’s slow 
progress rode out to the camp urging Moriarty to come as quickly as he could. He voiced 
concern over the poor defences that were weakly constructed but it was too late to make 
any changes and Tucker rode back to Luneburg. 
On the morning of the 12th of March at 3.30 a shot was heard coming from the 
direction of the north bank by the men in the camp. Lieutenant Harward at the south bank 
ordered his men to stand to, and sent a messenger to the other side of the bank to await 
instructions from Moriarty. The Captain was certain that there would be no attack and went 
back to sleep neglecting to order his men to remain on guard. At around five in the morning 
under cover of mist, the Zulu commander Mbilini led a force of between 800 and 4,000 men 
and lay undetected by sentries some seventy yards outside the camp46. The Zulus fired a 
volley with their rifles and then rushed the camp with their spears. The British forces could 
barely offer any resistance to the attack as many stumbled out of bed to face the enemy. 
The soldiers were quickly overrun and many tried to escape to the south bank by swimming 
the river, which was still being held by Harward’s men who provided covering fire to the 
retreating men. In Booth’s report, 
...we at once opened fire, and kept the fire up for about ten minutes or ¼ of an hour; 
the kaffirs were then in the river, in great numbers coming towards us, and at the 
same time assegaing the men from the other side...we commenced firing and 
retiring, having received the order from Mr Harward...47   
Lieutenant Harward believed that he did the best to ‘...endeavoured to rally my men, but 
they were too scattered and finding re-formation impossible, I mounted my horse and 
galloped to Luneburg at utmost speed...’48. This left Sergeant Booth to rally the surviving 
men and provide a slow retreat towards a deserted farm some three miles away from 
Luneburg. The Zulus finally gave up chase and returned to the other warriors already 
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plundering the camp.  Harward had reached the garrison of Luneburg at 6.30am to report to 
Major Tucker that the camp was in enemy hands and the Major ordered the men to march 
to Ntombe River. On arrival to the camp, Major Tucker noted 
...I found the laager completely wrecked, the cattle being taken and the contents of 
the wagons strewn about the place, and from the bank of the river we could see the 
dead bodies of our men lying about on the opposite side...I fear most have of them 
have been drowned or assegaid in the river...49 
By the time the arrival of Tucker with 150 men, the Zulus were retreating from the vicinity 
back to their strongholds in the hills for fear of reprisals. From the men that accompanied 
the escort, numbering 106; sixty two were dead including the captain along with seventeen 
civilian drivers50. Sergeant Booth who rallied the men under great discipline received the 
Victoria Cross for his bravery in action the following year and was promoted to Colour-
Sergeant. However doubt was cast on the actions of Lieutenant Harward, who galloped on 
horseback to Luneburg while deserting his men to their fate. The desertion by Harward was 
received with great distain in the army and followed up with a court martial, but he was 
found not guilty which astonished the military hierarchy51. The case had some similarities to 
the apparent saving of the colours at Isandlwana by Lieutenants Melvill and Coghill 
according to General Wolsey after hearing the verdict of not guilty. He remarked ‘the more 
helpless the position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to 
stay and share their fortune, whether for good or ill’52. The lieutenant may have escaped 
conviction but his military career was all but over and resigned his commission in 188053.  
The subsequent news articles read by the public offered quite accurate reports on 
the battle with official reports published by the Irish Times and The London Times by 
Lieutenant Harward and Major Tucker. So in that sense the public were receiving the same 
information as the War Office. However, as expected from the age of slow mail and 
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transport the reports of the battle were inadequate for some time. The London Times first 
report on the battle mentions that the wagons were ‘properly laagered, and judging by the 
result of Rorkes Drift...should of been able to hold his own against the enemy’54. The 
following inclusions of the Ntombe disaster were formatted on the basic line of including 
the main elements of the battle, with descriptions of the engagement by Harward, Tucker 
and a short note from Lord Chelmsford. Yet there was no questioning of the actions by the 
reporters of The London Times, in regards the desertion of the troops by Harward with a 
sheer lack of investigation into his conduct in front of the enemy. 
One would expect some criticism of the actions of Harward or even Moriarty in 
failing to provide adequate defence but it seals the faith of public knowledge on the incident 
when the report of the battle by Chelmsford was made public. The despatch from 
Chelmsford to the Secretary for War on the incident published in The Times London, signals 
that ‘...Lieutenant Harward appears to have done his utmost to assist his comrades in their 
struggle as soon as he was aware of what was occurring’55. The author Saul David explains 
that the cause of the disaster was the combination of bad luck; horrible weather and the 
inadequate precautions and defences and these errors were Moriarty’s responsibility. But 
with the captain dead, the obvious scapegoat was Harward56. From reading The London 
Times, the public would not have the opportunity to realise this as the reports only 
suggested the positive actions of the participants. However, one report shows a writer who 
looked beyond the incident itself and focuses on the extent of the action in the grander 
scheme of things. The writer believes that it is ‘utterly reckless’ to send a small infantry 
column on escort duty against a faster moving opponent but also that alongside the battle 
of Isandlwana, it ‘shows how inadequate to South African warfare is the straitlaced and red-
tape system of European military education’57. This is a rare glimpse from the newspaper of 
criticism towards the action at Ntombe albeit not blaming the men involved but the whole 
caste of the British military58. 
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The Irish times, much like its British counterpart, had published the same 
information such as the official battle accounts by Harward and Tucker, while the 
information on the battle varies little. Yet the Irish Times, unlike the London Times, was very 
critical of the engagement. The Irish paper dissects the battle reports and sources and 
focuses on the problems of the defences, the lack of precaution and is critical towards the 
Moriarty. A report from the paper begins with a critical narrative of the actions of Captain 
Moriarty which is missing from The London Times discussed before. It reads correctly that 
Tucker had notified Moriarty of the need for adequate defensive measures, yet ‘it is passing 
strange again that Captain Moriarty should have wholly ignored these instructions of his 
superior officer’59. The same news reports that even though Harward had roused his side of 
the camp after the first was heard before the onslaught the camp was ‘taken completely by 
surprise...and for these mistakes...Captain Moriarty had paid the penalty with his own life60. 
It is an interesting comparison between the English and Irish papers of what was discussed 
on the more pressing issues of the battle. The London Times only reported the disaster that 
occurred with no proper analysis of the events, while totalling omitting the behaviour of 
Harward. While the actions of Harward are missing from the Irish papers text, the articles go 
a significant way to informing the Irish public of a more accurate picture and descriptive 
analysis, so the reader would be better informed of events than the readers of The London 
Times across the Irish Sea.  
While there are numerous disparities between the papers already mentioned, the 
Illustrated London News, can be seen as contributing little to the public knowledge on 
Ntombe. Their sketch of the battle which made front page news is the only real contribution 
which offered a means in which to grasp the main issues of the conflict, in that it captures 
the public imagination instantly with its dramatic imagery. However one must be critical in 
viewing the image and contrasting it with actual reality. The sketch takes the format of 
central images in the Victorian Empire and the idea of what makes up the ideal British man. 
The author Michael Lieven explains that the main scenes of a British war are the portrayal of 
the ‘indomitable British infantrymen’ and the idea of the ‘last stand’ which was expected by 
the public in their army61. The picture of the battle mirrors those aspects mentioned, in a 
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bid to lessen the damage to national pride and to augment the action to the level of heroic 
stature in the eyes of the public. In comparison, the battle was far removed from the epic 
proportions of Isandlwana. The image grossly exaggerates the number of men involved, and 
even small details of the British men in full uniform, gives the impression that they were not 
caught off guard, and were prepared for action. Lieutenant Beverly Ussher who drew the 
sketch also provided a report of the battle. In his report he writes...’the Zulus...rushed by 
thousands on our men, and in a few minutes surrounded the camp’62. 
The first problem of this account is that the man in question was not present at the 
battle, but was part of Tucker’s reinforcements, and obviously gathered the information 
from survivors which could be construed to be inaccurate after the trauma of battle. The 
second problem is while there are inaccuracies in the account, he also fails to place blame, 
question or even announce any of the actions of Lieutenant Harward. Ussher omits that 
Harward reported the disaster to Luneburg, and simply ‘the news was brought into 
camp...and proceeded to the scene of the attack’63. The reason he may have left the 
information out about Harward may have well been to protect the honour of the regiment 
or simply perhaps to help out a fellow Lieutenant in the same regiment. For the Illustrated 
London News readers, this was the most detailed, if inaccurate, report of the battle that was 
published, with no analysis of the action made by the writers or editors. The paper offered 
little knowledge or accurate reporting on the engagement, and left the actions of Harward 
unwritten which compromised the public’s knowledge and therefore altered the reality of 
the ensuing war. 
The Illustrated London News, like The London Times and the Irish Times, had one 
thing in common: the absolute neglect of coverage towards the actions of Harward, with no 
critical analysis or raising questions of the possibility of desertion? One could understand 
following the defeat of Isandlwana, the military commanders or the press would not want to 
further embarrass the British army and the prestige of the Empire in the eyes of the public 
by suggesting the possibility of Harward’s cowardice. If the incident was made public or the 
battle dissected more critically, the readers would have seen a different aspect of the Zulu 
War, one that did not match the apparent heroism of Melville and Coghill in attempting to 
save the Queen’s Colours. To the British public, they saw the actions of Melville and Coghill 
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as military ‘heroes’, in which they would act as examples in teaching the young the qualities 
they must develop and reinforce the idea of the British gentlemen hero and courage64 
Lieutenant Harward certainly did not live up to the standards that the British public 
expected from their soldiers on the fateful day at Ntombe.  
The Irish Times, was the closest that any of the newspapers came to grasping the 
reality of the action for the public. As their analysis of the camp and the actions of Moriarty 
are judged and quite accurate, they still fail to question anything of the exploits of Harward. 
Perhaps, however, it is not the fault of the editors or the writers for failing to capitalise on 
the issue of desertion? The only two main reports of the battle are from Tucker and 
Harward, and even the telegraph from Lord Chelmsford published in the paper offered no 
criticism to Harward. What is also evident is that there is little or no input from the public in 
submitting letters to editors, which may be due to the fact they did not realise the reality of 
Harward’s actions during the course of the battle or it did not simply interest the public to 
the extent of Isandlwana and Rorkes Drift. If the truth was realised, the public may have 
turned against Harward, who may be seen to have put great stain on his Britain’s honour 
especially after witnessing the selfless defence of the 24th Regiment two months earlier. 
The Irish Times, as mentioned came close to critical scrutiny of the Captain and 
Lieutenant of the convoy. An interesting line from the paper reads ‘...though it maybe evil to 
speak ill of the dead...still worse though it may seem to speak evil of the living’65. Perhaps 
the writer was touching on the subject of Harward? However with that line it sums up that 
the reality of the battle and the desertion of Harward would never come to the public forum 
in the newspapers mentioned and a different perception of the battle would be created. 
Even if the editor of the Irish Times knew full well there were questions to be answered on 
Harward’s behaviour on that day in March66. 
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Chapter Four: The Prince Imperial 
‘Terrible, horrible news has fallen us like a thunderclap. The Prince Imperial is dead’ 
The London Times: 21 June, 1879. 
 
The early months of the Anglo-Zulu War, witnessed the British columns facing 
unparalleled, embarrassing defeats at Isandlwana, with further losses at Ntombe and 
Hlobane. The defeat at Isandlwana and the heroism at Rorke’s Drift which rescued the 
image of the redcoat was immediately overshadowed by an incident in a remote donga with 
the death of three men. Two were troopers while the other man was heir to arguably the 
greatest family in military history in the nineteenth century-the Bonaparte’s. 
In March 1856, the Empress Eugenie husband to Napoleon III of France gave birth to 
the future of the Bonaparte’s Imperial Dynasty- Louis Napoleon. From his birth he was 
surrounded by the past glories of his great-uncle and of France, and was introduced into the 
army at the age of nine months, becoming a member of the 1st Imperial Guard Regiment. In 
his teenage years he became an excellent horseman and swordsmen while following his 
father as an observer to the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. The defeat of 
the Second Empire of Napoleon led to the family’s exile in England with the future of 
Imperial France almost destroyed. The family were welcomed enthusiastically by England, 
despite Queen Victoria viewing the situation as a political embarrassment which greatly 
annoyed many French. Louis joined the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich with the 
support of the Duke of Cambridge, and excelled in class and accepted an invitation to join 
the Royal Artillery at the age of eighteen67. When his father died he took the title Napoleon 
the IV and waited for his recall back to France to reclaim the family throne. However his 
involvement with the British Army was seen as scandalous to many French people.  
Following the defeat at Isandlwana, soldiers were being dispatched to Zululand to 
reinforce the already depleted forces of the centre column. Louis in a bid to see action made 
public his reasons for his decision to volunteer saying it was to show his gratitude to Queen 
but according to the author Morris he had more pressing reasons. Gaining his first military  
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experience would put further precedent to the French throne and make his claim legitimate 
and also the Zulus were the prefect adversary which would not cause outrage in comparison 
to fighting a continental power for the English68. In order to calm any problems and distress 
with his party69 in France he would be sent as an observer with no meaningful military role. 
The Duke of Cambridge wrote a letter to the already burdened Lord Chelmsford with the 
information pertaining the Prince’s role in the army in Zululand. It reads, 
...the Prince Imperial who is going out on his own account to see as much as he can 
of the coming campaign in Zululand. He is extremely anxious to go out and wanted 
to be employed in our army...if you show him kindness and tender him a position to 
see as much as he can with the columns in the Field I hope you will do so. He is a fine 
young fellow, full of spirit and pluck...My only anxiety on his conduct would be, that 
he is too plucky and go ahead70. The final words in the letter would prove to be 
fatefully correct71.  
Louis was permitted to join the forces in Zululand only as an unofficial spectator. He made 
himself useful in the camp by performing a variety of tasks that were needed with 
enthusiasm. He also joined many of the scouting missions that were being made by the 
Second Division, in preparation of locating a new camp site closer to the target of the Zulu 
capital. Louis ‘plucky and go ahead’ nature was illustrated early on in his campaign, when on 
patrol with Colonel Buller, he rode ahead to give chase to some lone Zulus in the 
surrounding hills without support or knowledge of the ground ahead. Despite Louis 
returning unharmed after an unsuccessful foray, Buller was outraged by the actions of the 
young French prince, and wrote a letter of complaint to Lord Chelmsford. The commander-
in-chief agreed and ordered the senior officer Colonel Harrison, who was responsible for 
identifying suitable routes for transport, to keep Louis in the camp at all times unless strong 
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escort was provided. Louis himself saw these orders but the concerns for his safety by the 
higher command but he remained unheeded.  
On the first day of June, Louis in his usual eager manner, asked Colonel Harrison to 
allow him to complete the topographical sketches that he had begun on the new campsite 
and the regions beyond. According to Ian Knight, the patrol was hardly needed on the 
justification of military grounds, but on the excuse that Louis was bored with camp life and 
wished to make himself useful and active for others.72 Harrison saw no danger in sending 
the prince out, as the area that he would visit had been already been searched for Zulus, 
and was in seeing distant of the original camp site, with mounted men scouting the 
surrounding areas. Lieutenant Carey, who had formed a strong bond with the prince, 
volunteered to accompany the escort and to supervise and give guidance on the young 
man’s sketches. However Harrison failed to appoint someone to command the escort, and 
this would lead to debate after the death of the prince, of who was actually was in 
command during the time the patrol was away from the camp? 
The men who formed the small escort were Carey, Sergeant Willis, Corporal Grubb 
and troopers Cochrane, Le Tocq, Abel, Rogers and a Zulu guide. During the journey, there 
was an opportunity to add further troops to the patrol, but Louis declined believing that the 
patrol was strong enough. They rode for some hours until arriving at an abandoned kraal, 
where the prince dismounted to continue the maps he had begun and drink coffee with the 
men. Carey decided that the area was a poor choice, due to the fact there was decent cover 
surrounding the area that would allow a swift ambush. Louis overruled him. After some 
time, a lone Zulu was spotted in the nearby hills and this persuaded Louis to order the men 
to saddle up and mount. However the horses were off grazing and it took ten minutes to 
assemble. While the men had been relaxing in the area other Zulus who were aware of their 
position had crept around the kraal in a bid to surround them. While there would be a 
debate of who was in charge of the patrol, responsibility would fall on Carey for not 
ordering or at least suggesting that a picket should have be in place. A man of his experience 
and usual vigilance would not be excused for his indecision which proved fateful. 
Just as the prince and Carey issued the order to mount, shots rang out and... 
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I saw the black faces of Zulus about twenty yards off, rushing towards us...I thought 
that all were mounted...I judged better to clear the long grass before making a stand. 
Knowing from experience the bad shooting of the Zulus, I did not expect anyone was 
injured...a man said to me ‘I fear the Prince is killed, Sir.’ I paused looked back, and, 
seeing the Prince’s horse galloping on the other side of the donga, asked if it was any 
use returning73.  
The prince unable to mount his horse met his end making a brave stand with his face to the 
enemy. He received seventeen assegai wounds in the cause of British imperialism. Abel and 
Rogers were also killed and disembowelled as Carey and the men fled from the scene. The 
men galloped for miles until meeting Buller’s patrol in the vicinity. After telling the 
unbelievable truth that the prince was dead, Buller replied, ‘You ought to be shot and I hope 
you will be. I could shoot you myself’74. When news reached the camp, it was first thought 
as a joke but the seriousness soon dawned on the men. The war had been plagued with bad 
luck since Isandlwana, and as soon as the new invasion was gaining momentum, a single 
death occurred causing important political ramifications. Chelmsford, who had suffered so 
much in the campaign, ‘is awfully cut up about it as he will be blamed for letting him go with 
so small an escort’75.  
Due to the failing light, it was thought advisable to wait until reveille next morning 
before beginning the search for the body, so as not to lose any more lives. While the camp 
settled down for the night, Carey wrote a letter to his wife, deeply depressed and shocked 
at the day’s ordeal. However the content of the letter, would soon back-fire and disgrace 
him for life. He writes...  
I am a ruined man, I fear, though from my letter which will be in the papers you will 
see I could not do anything else. Still the loss of the Prince is a fearful thing...Our 
camp was bad, but then, I have been so laughed at for taking a squadron with that I 
have grown reckless and would have gone with two men...As regards leaving the 
Prince, I am innocent...I shall be blamed but honestly between you and me, I can 
only be blamed for the camp...10. 
The following day, Chelmsford sent out a recovering party to retrieve the young prince. The 
party found the body of the prince and the two other men badly mutilated76. Chelmsford  
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had also sent his staff surgeon, Surgeon-Major Scott to inspect the body, and the following 
lines are from his report at the scene. He explained... 
He was lying on his back, with his left arm across him, in the position of self defence. 
I counted eighteen assegai wounds all in front...There were no bullet wounds on the 
body...There was a patch of blood, underneath the head and the neck, which 
appeared to me to be caused by wounds received on the side of the neck, and also a 
wound through the right eye-ball. The prince’s body was entirely stripped77. 
After that fateful Sunday, Carey tried to continue his duties but due to the 
continuing pressure from his colleagues who placed the blame on him, he requested an 
inquest to exonerate himself. His request was accepted. Carey was tried by general court 
martial. The court charged him with deserting the Prince and misbehaving in front of the 
enemy, and despite his good defence he was found guilty and sent home. To his surprise 
when he arrived home, he was received by the public with great enthusiasm who saw him 
as a hero. The Queen and several royal members were disgusted by Carey abandoning Louis 
to his fate, yet surprisingly they were in the minority.  
The main question to be asked at this point in the eyes of the public and the media 
was who was to blame for the death of the Prince Imperial of France? Scholarly research 
into the event over the years have made several attempts to understand who was 
responsible for the incident, with the blame being firmly rested on the shoulders of Carey, 
but noted discrepancies against Louis himself, Harrison and even Lord Chelmsford. Author 
Saul David, believes that the flight of Carey and his men from the kraal was poor judgement 
and should have attempted to rally his men and head back to the Prince78. On the question 
of rallying the men, Ian Knight says that the attempt to rally would have been useless to 
those who had fallen, and would have probably caused the death of the rest of the patrol 
needlessly79. Yet as Knight explains that ‘the appearance of courage was sometimes more 
important than courage itself’80, which holds much truth as the pride that the British soldier 
took in demonstrating bravery and honour in the face of the enemy, disregarding their own 
safety. Carey’s court martial was overturned due to lack of evidence and he was allowed to 
return to the army. However due to his persistence in trying to rid himself of the guilt in the 
eyes of the prince’s mother, he kept writing letters to persuade her to hold an audience 
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with him. Being tired of the insensitivity of Carey, she published the letter that he wrote to 
his wife on the night the Prince died. It showed that Carey was guilty of cowardice which 
disgraced him. He died a lonely man, obscure within his own regiment in 1883.  The death of 
the Prince was a sad, tragic event, yet it did nothing to the hamper the increasing 
momentum of British victories. Despite its huge media attention, it was as Charles Newman 
who plainly places the death in history; ‘the death of the Prince Imperial...can only be 
regarded as a minor episode of the campaign, especially from a military point of view81. 
After the defeat at Isandlwana, the war took on national interest, with many 
correspondents sent to report on the conflict to satisfy the demands of public curiosity. 
Within the camp that Louis had been attached, there were numerous war correspondents 
from The London Times, Standard, Illustrated London News and the French paper Le Figaro. 
These writers could never have imagined the story that was about to break and yet they 
were granted the biggest media story of the year82. While it would of immense interest to 
see how the death of the Prince was portrayed in the French press, unfortunately space and 
time will not allow such a venture at this present time. The night the body was brought back 
into the camp, the Illustrated London News artist Melton Prior, was busy by candle-light 
drawing the first images of the death of Louis. 
As already mentioned, the death of the prince, heir to the French Imperial throne, 
was a media sensation throughout the civilised world. The death was a shock to the French 
people, and a major embarrassment for the British. The three papers that are the basis for 
the thesis will be discussed presently, to illustrate how the media handled the affair, and 
more importantly who they held accountable for such an avoidable incident. The Illustrated 
London News provided the first images to the world of the final moments of Louis’s life, yet 
more importantly to the research it embodied much written accounts and analysis that can 
now be outlined and discussed. The first reports came in on June 28, nearly a month after 
the incident, and similar to the other two papers the death of the prince’s was met with 
sincere grief. As expected the first intelligence surrounding the prince’s death is vague so 
more attention is focussed on the views of British, European statesmen and monarchy. The 
paper is quick to point out that the War Office and Horse Guards had no part to play in 
                                                          
81
 Charles Norris-Newman, In Zululand with the British Army: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 through the first-
hand experiences of a special correspondent (London, 1880) p  206. 
82
 The death of the Prince Imperial was the highest ranking press coverage of the year 1879, with the marriage 
of the Duke of Connaught to Princess Louise of Prussia in second, and in third place the defeat at Isandlwana. 
49 
 
encouraging Louis to go on the expedition, but went ‘on his own account’83. This is 
mentioned again in the next paragraph, which shows clearly to the reader that the paper is 
trying to distance any thought of conspiracy by the government or the Queen, which was 
believed by some. 
 While researching Isandlwana, the same paper questioned the validity of the war by 
the British and the Illustrated London News pushes forward that argument again with the 
Prince as an example. It reads that ‘the tragical [sic] death of the Prince Imperial in an 
insignificant foray...seems to be read by little profit...such manliness, modesty, gentleness, 
and high-trained intelligence snatched from this life by the hands of a few barbarians’84. The 
paper is illustrating that the death of the Prince was insignificant in the sense for the cause 
for which he was involved for. The proud Prince ‘was the most inglorious casualty’85. The 
paper took great effort to show how they perceived the Prince, by giving detailed 
background to Louis and his family. They noted the great rivalry that existed between the 
two nations, but there was an honour in the fact that Louis represented himself so well in 
British military tradition. The stories of the grieving Empress would have really touched the 
nation, and supported by Queen Victoria. The images that are shown in this chapter, give a 
sense of how the Prince was perceived by the press, with pictures of him in his mother’s 
arms and his final days. He was on the cover of many issues of the paper, and with the 
continued interest lasting until his funeral, illustrates that the public were certainly gripped 
by the death of the Prince.  
While it is important and interesting to give more insight on how the death of the 
prince was perceived, the real focus of the following paragraphs is on the opinions of the 
Illustrated London News and their readers on who was to blame? At the beginning of the 
press coverage and before detailed reports became available, there was the popular opinion 
that it was just a misfortune of war and purely an accident. Yet the paper was quick to 
establish that the War Office and Horse Guards could not be held responsible for the death. 
So who was to blame? 
On the fifth of July, the Illustrated London News, reported details of the death of the 
Prince, with accounts from the participants at the court-martial. The evidence was from  
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Lieutenant Carey, Sergeant Willis, Corporal Grubb, Trooper Cochrane, and Trooper Letocq. 
The evidence supplied by Carey can be seen as a man trying to shift the responsibility of 
command to the prince, reinforcing his earlier opinion that the prince was in charge of the 
patrol. Throughout he mentions in several cases that it was the Prince’s decision and idea’s 
that shaped the patrols movement and safety. Carey said that he asked the Prince should 
they wait for a stronger escort to join them, and Louis replied, ‘Oh no; we are quite strong 
enough’86. In another incident Carey says that he suggested to the Prince, that the group 
should off-saddle in a location but Louis wished to choose the kraal as an area to rest. 
Before the attack, Carey said he suggested that they should saddle-up and move on but the 
Prince said to ‘wait another ten minutes’87. He admits that there were no precautions to 
placing a guard in the area, but he fails to mention that this was his duty. With the 
information given that the prince gave orders to the patrol, the reader may assume that 
precautions were Louis’s responsibility, and Carey did his best to prevent any danger 
occurring. 
From the other evidence recorded, they all mentioned that the Prince was giving 
orders said to the men, yet Corporal Grubbs in answering the question who was leading the 
retreat, said it was Lieutenant Carey. It shows a similar trait to Lieutenant Harward at 
Ntombe, that Carey, who neglected the safety of the men, was now leading the retreat. The 
story hardly portrays the heroics that fill the British annals. The evidence from Letocq 
further expresses that nothing was done to help the Prince and the other two men left 
behind. He was asked ‘Were any orders given to stop or rally, or try to save the Prince? He 
answered ‘no’88. Carey believed that due to the bad shooting of the Zulu’s he did not think 
anyone was injured and continued the retreat for some time. While it was clear from their 
testimonies that they believed that the Prince was probably killed at the beginning, no one 
is critical towards their own actions. Yet it was heard from Letocq, that Carey said ‘lets us 
make haste, and go quickly’89, which sums up the reality of their escape, as no attempt was 
made even to recover the body or show some defiant defence at a different position. While 
it may have been useless to do something, an act of bravery may have made the situation a 
bit more bearable for Carey and something the army and the public would like to hear. 
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The following week, the paper includes the verdict of the court of enquiry on the 
actions of Carey. The information is accurate so the readers now had the chance to read a 
full account of the findings of the court compared to the evidence given in the paper the 
week before. The main findings read ‘the court is of the opinion that Lieutenant Carey did 
not understand the position in which he stood to the Prince’ and that ‘the court deeply 
regrets that no effort was made to rally the escort’90. While the evidence is against Carey, 
including testimony given by Harrison, the paper does not condemn the actions of him. 
Immediately after the information is published on the court findings, the paper goes straight 
into a short narration of Carey’s life in the military and speaks very highly over him. 
However the position of the Illustrated London News is highlighted on the death of the 
Prince on the thirtieth of August. The paper believes that the acquittal of Carey for the 
responsibility of the death of the Prince is fair but makes no attempt to establish who was to 
blame. They publish some words from the Duke of Cambridge, expressing that Chelmsford 
did all he could for the safety for the Prince, but Harrison, failed to explain the orders to 
Carey thus leading Carey to misinterpret them. The paper does little to express their 
opinions on the incident, with more interest in the funeral of the young man than his actual 
death. They clearly believed that Carey was innocent but no mention is made if Harrison 
was also innocent. The words expressed by the Duke, puts Harrison in the frame, yet the 
paper makes no attempt to point any fingers and leaves it entirely up for the reader to 
decide.  
The Irish Times, from the beginning of their first reports on the incident reflected the 
same opinion and material as the Illustrated London News published. They released vague 
reports of the event with more of an emphasis on the great legacy of the Bonaparte family 
and the effect the death of Louis would have in politics in France and the rest of Europe. Yet 
a key difference emerges in the Irish paper, as unlike the Illustrated London News, it has a 
more personal element involving the public readers. A poem was written a day after the 
first announcement of the death of Louis, and it is clear that his death had a strong effect on 
the Irish public. The poem is rather long so the last few lines are as follows, and which 
expresses the deep regret the public held while in the process of writing the words. It 
reads... 
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And France doth weep, Republic through see be 
Whilst Britain mourns him martyr’d in her cause 
E’eu thoughtless natures mid their pleasures pause 
And eyes regretful tremble feelingly  
That he so hopeful and young should die91 
 
Throughout the paper, there are letters and messages of condolences from European 
statesmen and monarchy, with church services held in the great cities including Rome. Yet 
this was not lost on the Irish public. The people of County Cork and Cork Corporation had a 
meeting to vote whether they should express their condolences to Empress Eugenie for her 
loss, as ‘the feeling in Cork and its neighbourhood is one of widespread regret at the 
melancholy fate which has befallen the Prince Imperial’92. From that it reinforces the idea 
that the public at large felt great sympathy for the young man and his mother. 
With regards to where the blame should be placed, the Irish Times did not hide away 
from revealing information and opinions that may have affected the reader’s judgement. 
Unlike the Illustrated London News, the Irish paper released information from French papers 
and correspondents on the death of the Prince, on who was to blame. The less jingoistic 
paper, illustrated the opinion of the French with blame resting on Chelmsford and the 
soldiers that accompanied the Prince. The French ‘are daily becoming more trenchant in 
their criticism of the conduct of Lord Chelmsford in allowing the Prince to expose his life the 
way he did and especially of his companions of the reconnaissance expedition in leaving him 
to his fate’93. Another article expresses that the prince died ‘whether by the unpardonable 
negligence of Lord Chelmsford or by the cowardice, unworthy of English soldiers of which 
those composed the reconnaissance’94. It is a strong judgement, yet it can be understood 
that tensions and grief were running high and criticism would be expected. It seems harsh 
though to blaming Chelmsford as from the beginning he did not want the extra burden of a 
royal celebrity to control. The criticism that is expressed on the actions of the ‘cowardice’ 
soldiers can be seen as legitimate. The evidence supplied to the media shows that the men 
did not make a stand and left the French man to his death, even though by that stage 
nothing could have been done. Yet the French people could have seen it as convenient that 
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the English would leave behind a man of a higher order in life to ‘savages’ in a remote 
donga. Suspicions within France believed a conspiracy was at hand resulting in his death.   
While the French may have been eager for swift justice towards Carey, the Germans 
took a different view. The Irish Times published a statement from the German Military Press 
believing that nothing could have been done to safe the Prince. Their take on the incident is 
quite blunt as it reads that if the men stayed behind it would have been ‘uselessly dying 
with him’ for the reason ‘bearing in mind that this was a case of a foreign spectator in a 
position of peril which he had voluntarily sought’95. They believed that the court-martial of 
Carey should not be harsh as it should take into consideration that if the Prince had not 
fallen but others had, prosecution would have not followed. It has to be considered that 
relations between France and German were extremely poor after the Franco-German War, 
and it seems the Germans are taking the side of a British man over a member of the 
Imperial Family for spite. Their assessment of the death is Louis’s as he volunteered to join 
the army and he must be ‘prepared to meet a soldier’s fate. Rank and position must look for 
no distinction there’96. It is certainly bleak and direct on the matter, yet it does hold some 
strong truths within their judgement. 
The contrasting opinion between these two countries is very interesting. The French 
grieved by the death of their prince, following the Queens Colours, was perceived as a grave 
injustice, for which someone needed to be blamed. While the Germans were more direct in 
their opinion, it may be due to their animosity with the French, or quite simply, the German 
military hierarchy are men of great tradition from the ideals of Prussia, and death is simply a 
part of war and one needs to accept that. However, for the Irish there were questions to be 
asked and answered as the paper believed it was vastly important for the honour of the 
country. The writer states that while they are expecting information from Chelmsford, they 
are more eager to hear from Carey as he is said to be an Irishman. The reason he is 
proposed to be Irish is unclear as Carey was born in Leicestershire and his father was also 
English. Yet his supposed country of origin was ‘anxious for the proof they feel assured...that 
he did his duty like a soldier...for the hope of a great people’97. Throughout the text, there 
seems to be a sincere fear from the writer, that Carey may have been a coward and let the 
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country and Empire down. Despite this the writer is professional and does not let any bias 
interfere within his work. He asks many questions regarding the incident. He speaks of the 
sheer neglect of the patrol for the choice of area, and not sending any guard to scout the 
area. The writer is bemused by the fact that the patrol was in utter panic, in which he 
relates it to a stampede, did nothing to ‘attempt to help a follow officer in distress’98. He 
worries about the effect that this will have on the reputation of the British military and its 
officers, and the damage to the prestige of the Great Empire and prides on courage?  
Another article that appears in the Irish Times, shows clear resolution in the fact that 
Carey should be exonerated from blame for the incident and also supports the writings of 
Army and Navy Gazette, ‘for its manly defence of the abused Captain Carey’99. The Irish 
paper clearly supports their fellow Irishman Carey and believes that the case before him is 
wrong and unjust100. It signals out that Army and Navy Gazette is the only paper that 
misfortunate officers can rely on to state facts and remain unbiased. The journal ‘is capable 
of keeping a clear head when all others go in to a frenzy, directly a soldier is guilty of error, 
or imaginary error’101. The support of such a strong journal in Britain, and the main paper in 
Ireland, would have brought welcome relief to burdened Carey, for which he would exploit. 
The defence of Carey shows other clear indications that the Irish Times, were going to 
publish opinions that were to show their support for the man, as well as ‘their appreciation 
of his gallantry as an officer’102. The sheer amount of encouragement expressed in the 
paper, coinciding with the article that had some doubts and reservations of the action of 
Carey, illustrates that the Irish Times, were entirely within the influence of the British 
Empire. The writers for the paper shows how many of the ideals of being British and their 
prestige was being absorbed into Irish culture, with a sincere fear of an Irishman betraying 
the honour of Ireland and Britain in the face of the world.  
 The London Times reporting on the death of Louis began in similar fashion with little 
information on how the death occurred but more on the international grief that was being 
expressed as well as the political aftermath that would ensue. While reports began to 
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appear from Carey on his explanation on the event that unfolded, it was not until the 
question of court-martial, that the paper began to surpass the other papers in analysis and 
opinion. On August 23, the paper released the statement of the court findings of the case 
against Carey, with words expressing that he was in ‘command’ of the patrol. The London 
Times immediately begins to dissect the information in a direct and sensible manner.  The 
paper builds up a defence for Carey, not on the grounds of being a scapegoat or unfairly 
convicted by superiors but on military regulations. It reads that Carey was in command only 
because he was the senior officer in charge, yet because he did not understand the position 
he was in during the patrol, ‘he would be free from blame both morally and legally’103. It 
goes on to say that Carey was placed in this position due to unclear orders of Harrison in 
organising the party but also due to Carey ignorance that he was a junior officer to the 
Prince. Unlike the other papers it is clearly using the evidence to help to generate a 
coherent appraisal of the situation without being biased to any particular aspect or person.  
 With regards misbehaviour in front of the enemy, the paper asks the question, Did 
Captain Carey’s conduct reasonably fall within this description? The writer believes that had 
Carey gathered his patrol after the attack and went back looking for the Prince, it would 
have resulted in their death. He makes the sensible argument that the idea of the patrol is 
not to fight, but to remain alive and bring back information. Had Carey returned to the kraal 
immediately ‘he might have surrounded his memory with undying fame; but he would have 
achieved no useful result’104. The paper is in full confidence that Carey should not have been 
found guilty, but unlike the other papers, that conclusion was founded on excellent analysis 
of the situation coinciding with in-depth military rules and regulations to form a strong 
argument that some modern historians believe in today. In a letter by Adjutant-General to 
the General Officer in South Africa, C.H Ellice, shows his opinions on the situation with 
blame resting more on the shoulders of Harrison who began ‘that train of events’105 for not 
following strict orders on the duties of Louis. He writes that Chelmsford, gave strict orders 
that he must be contacted before Louis underwent any expedition to distant regions with a 
strong escort and accompanied by an officer. Blame begins to be placed on Harrison, for not 
seeking Chelmsford permission in allowing Louis out of the camp, and also ‘his orders to  
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Lieutenant Carey were not sufficiently explicit, and he failed to impress upon the Prince the 
duty of deferring to the military orders of the officer who accompanied him’106. As 
mentioned, the actions of Harrison, in the writers’ opinion, had a knock-on effect on the 
conduct of Carey, who believed that Louis held a military superior rank to his own, yet the 
writer is correct to mention that even though there were defective orders given, Carey in his 
vast military experience should have guided him to do his duty. The Adjutant-General is 
unscrupulous in his criticism of Harrison, which was an aspect missing from most reports of 
the three papers researched, while he is critical of the conduct of Carey, he refrains in giving 
the opinion that he is wholly to blame for the disaster. This may be due to a clear analysis of 
the evidence for which he obtained, or perhaps maybe due to the increasing support for 
Carey in wider public circles, that made him hold his reservations on the issue.  
 During these debates on the death of Carey, the conservative papers and the wider 
public sphere held the opinion that Carey should be free of all charge and guilt. Yet, as 
expected there were some aspects that were in total contrast to the educated debates of 
the media. The Irish Times reported that in England, there were several death threats made 
on the life of Carey, with even societies formed to deal out their justice on him. The threats 
were made through several letters posted to him, which was then handed over to Scotland 
Yard for further investigation. From this evidence, it was clear that a minority held Carey to 
blame for the incident which may have come from French Bonaparte’s living in England 
wanting to exact revenge for the death of their Prince. 
 As mentioned, it was clear that the majority of the public were in full support of 
Carey to his surprise. Yet from the research provided by The London Times, he became 
extremely accustomed to the media spotlight, with several newspaper interviews and 
speeches that he made to express thanks to the people. However, from the information in 
the paper, he tries to force the issue of his innocence with constant mention of his hard 
struggle since June. Several examples are seen with a bid to increase public sympathy. In a 
letter that he wrote, which was published in The London Times, voicing thanks to the public 
for supporting him, and repeatedly mentioning the hardship that he had been through in his 
ordeal. He says, ‘I felt sorrow, not for anything I had done or left undone, but for the 
unhappy position in which I found myself placed through no fault of my own...I have done 
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nothing to be ashamed of’107. He believes the confidence of the people helped him to be 
vindicated and remain honourably to his country and army. The public support helped Carey 
from the beginning and the increasing support allowed him to attempt his own public 
relations campaign.  
His campaign took the role of mentioning his innocence repeatedly to force the issue 
into the public mind, and even though he had majority support, it is clear that he needed 
everyone to believe him. This is illustrated, when he writes ‘I regret that there is still some 
censure resting on me, as the supposed commander of the escort but I assure you, Sir, that I 
feel it unmerited, though hard to explain away, and I hope yet exculpate myself’108. He also 
mentions God many times, suggesting that divinity help the public see that he was innocent. 
With this in mind, he was a religious man, but focusing on God, may help him seem faithful 
and truthful in the eyes of the Christian community in England. The sheer amount of media 
presence led him to believe that the he was free from guilt in the public eyes, yet one 
person still would not hold an audience with him, the one that he wanted so much. The 
popularity that he received in the public made him misjudge that the establishment was 
also of the same opinion. He was wrong. His continuous request to see the Empress, and his 
tasteless public campaign led to his ultimate downfall.  
The press coverage of the death of the Prince Imperial surpassed all other media 
stories of that year. The three papers, while conveying mostly of the same information, it 
was The London Times, which benefited the readers the most. While all the papers agreed in 
the conclusion that Carey was innocent, The London Times was able to give detailed analysis 
of the events that led to an educated decision. The paper was able to take advantage of the 
evidence and decide the outcome in a knowledgeable manner. The Illustrated London News 
main contribution to the death of the prince was the first images produced on the event, 
but other than that, they offered the basic information The London Times and the Irish 
Times contained. The Irish paper was interested in the international opinion of Britain and 
Europe, yet it exposed fully how incorporated they were with the British and Empire’s 
attitude to bravery and courage. The writers of the paper express fear and anxiety that 
Carey had let Ireland and the Empire down through cowardice, which illustrates how far 
Ireland had been integrated into British society. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 ‘We regret to observe that grossly mistaken notions of the past conduct of Cetewayo as King 
of the Zulus and that much undeserved obloquy has been cast upon him’ 
 Illustrated London News: 13 September, 1879. 
 
Following the first reports on the massive defeat to the British centre column at 
Isandlwana, this once largely unnoticed war became a media sensation. The huge public 
demand for more detailed reports on the war coincided with the major newspapers sending 
out their war correspondents to Zululand. The British and Irish public were gripped by the 
war, as defeats and victories were being published in the papers. The readers were treated 
to lavish illustrations and written word honouring Britain’s soldiers, including the attempted 
saving of the Queen’s Colours at Isandlwana, the defence of Rorkes Drift, the death of the 
Prince Imperial and the final battle of Ulundi. 
 The public had the opportunity, to make their own judgements on many of the key 
issues surrounding the war. In the majority of the cases the information that they gathered 
from the papers was identical to the reports received by the War Office and the 
government. The many letters submitted to the editors, indicated that the war had reached 
the consciousness of the people. The papers also published debates from the Houses of 
Parliament, giving the ordinary citizen an inside view of the main issues of the war that 
concerned their government.  
Did the papers subdue the reality of the war and thereby create a false public 
perception? From the research of this thesis, there is much evidence to suggest that the 
public’s perceptions were altered but no less than expected during the age of imperialism. 
Examples illustrated throughout the thesis showed how the more controversial issues were 
never debated in the papers, due to misreporting which led to sheer neglect dissecting 
factual information to benefit the readers. However the papers could be faulted for not 
being more proactive in reporting the reality of the war and a huge lack of analysis was 
evident to suggest that. From the evidence, it can be deducted that the papers did not 
suppress any information that it received. It published letters, official dispatches, parliament 
reports, battle accounts but despite this it made the error of not analysing the information  
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sufficiently and in a thorough manner. The papers took the obvious route from the 
beginning of the war that the British were fighting for the expansion and protection of the 
Empire, against ‘uncivilised’ warriors. Fortunately the perceptions found in the newspapers 
covering the final reports of the war reflected regret and dishonour asking how and why the 
war was fought. It resulted in the public and the papers finally coming to terms with some 
reality of the war, with serious questions being asked on the conduct of Frere and 
Chelmsford. 
 In each of the topics researched, the papers never maintained a balanced in 
analysing and reporting. In many examples the writing for the Illustrated London News, was 
bland and predictable with more emphasis on its illustrations which offered great interest to 
the reader. Yet, surprisingly in some cases the paper displayed the most modern view on 
society and imperialism. The London Times in their analysis contrasted differently to events. 
The reporting on Isandlwana and the death of the Prince Imperial was much in-depth, with 
an awareness of many of the key issues. However in contrast the disaster at Ntombe River 
was met with poor commentary and offering mundane views of the battle.  The Irish Times, 
in the majority of cases was the most outspoken of the three papers but failed to respond 
sufficiently during coverage of Isandlwana and Prince Imperial. Surprisingly, its coverage on 
the Ntombe River was excellent, and did its best to offer critical views on the battle. The 
Irish Times was a conservative paper like its British counterparts. It did however offer some 
Irish opinions and views on the war but the writers in most cases were no less critical than 
the papers in Britain.  
 The incidents portrayed in the thesis had a unique similarity to each other. In each 
case there was a question of desertion and cowardice. While it is not surprising that no 
critical view was made on Melville and Coghill, the papers were very lenient in respect to 
Harward’s desertion. The question of Carey despite the press having the evidence from the 
court-martial produced a public perception that Carey was innocent. Only through his own 
actions did Carey reveal his true colours. The majority of the public and press believed that 
these men were victims of circumstance. But the military hierarchy did criticise these men in 
direct contrast to what was published in the newspapers. Yet after Isandlwana, bad news or 
negative journalism was a rare occurrence, overall altering the true reality of this war.  
The purpose of this thesis was to see how the Anglo-Zulu War was perceived and 
viewed in the national media. The question asked from the beginning was did the media 
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portray an image of the war that hampered the opinions and views of the reader? It did 
prove that the papers in many cases were incomplete in their analysis and adopted the 
usual narrative and jingoistic material that was expected from such conservative 
newspapers. However, the research brought about new questions that would need further 
study. The analysis from the thesis, in the British mindset, illustrated that the heroics and 
acts of gallantry were all expected from their soldiers and further acts as a case study into 
idea of Empire and its preservation throughout Victoria’s reign. It is accepted because of the 
limits to the space allowed within the thesis, that the work is narrow within itself and is a 
mere introduction. It can be envisaged as a case study into conservative thinking during the 
age of imperialism and society during the final quarter of the nineteenth-century and that it 
indicated the sheer volume of enthusiasm the Empire had for war, which was in complete 
contrast to the conscientious objectors that emerged during the Second Anglo-Boer War of 
1899.  
 What did the thesis portray about Ireland during the time of the Anglo-Zulu War? 
The research illustrated how far Ireland had become attached to Britain and its Empire, by 
adopting many of the features such as bravery, prestige, honour, the idea of the hero and 
the pride of dying for the sacrifice of Empire. Throughout many of the reports it was clear 
that there was no cultural barrier between Britain and Ireland, with expressed regret when 
a member of their country dishonoured their ‘parent’ nation. Considering during these years 
with the ever growing political movement of Irish Home Rule, the information that was 
gathered from the Irish Times would have indicated that Ireland was in no mood for self-
governance and wished to remain a part of the expanding Empire. This is however a narrow 
interpretation of how Ireland was perceived through analysis of the Irish Times. It was the 
principal paper in Ireland at the time, and for that reason it was selected for research, yet its 
downfall was its expected pro-unionist instincts and promotion of imperial ideology. As 
mentioned the thesis can only be regarded as an introduction to some aspects of media and 
war-reporting during the Anglo-Zulu War so it is clear that much more work is needed to 
give a complete picture. In the case of Ireland, no nationalists’ papers were researched 
which may have offered different versions on the war and would have contrasted to the 
image of the Empire which was accepted as the norm. The Anglo-Zulu War through the Irish 
media portrayed the image that Ireland was going to remain within the Empire and would 
have an important impact in the two Anglo-Boer Wars that followed. The number of  
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Irishmen fighting through all stages of the Zulu War and the deployment of the Connaught 
Rangers at the closing stages of the conflict created a sense of pride among Irish Unionists 
who saw Ireland’s contribution as having a positive effect on British political and foreign 
policy. 
The power and might of the Zulu Empire was brought to an end after the British 
victory at Ulundi and the capture of the Zulu King, Cetshwayo. The war had lasted eight 
months costing the lives of many men on both sides with huge economic cost to the British 
taxpayer. When the war finally came to a close, Cetshwayo the once ‘barbaric’ and 
‘despotic’ ruler was treated as a celebrity in South Africa and England with even an audience 
held with Queen Victoria. Just before the end of hostilities Lord Chelmsford was replaced by 
the iconic General Wolseley and Sir Bartle Frere had to resign his post for his role in the Zulu 
conflict that produced many failures. However doubt would be cast over the whole war with 
public discontent over the conflict after realising that some of the media reports were based 
on misinformation. The Zulu Empire was split into thirteen districts by Lord Wolseley with 
no further thought and support. The British Army retired leaving the Zulus to their own fate. 
The country for the next several years was plagued with civil war, resulting in the death of 
the returned exiled King Cetshwayo by rival tribes. The last Zulu uprising was in 1906. This 
was their last gamble to unite the split kingdom. It failed disastrously.  
The once proud people were placed into poverty surrounded by racial segregation 
that hampered South Africa’s progress for almost a century. The Zulu people could only 
reflect on their past glories and the once great Zulu Empire through their memories while 
British monuments and graves scattered the battlefields. As the war correspondents and 
writers returned home, the once great Zulu Kingdom was left to its own fate in a now white 
world. The last great independent people in South Africa became a footnote in history for 
many years. 
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